Bayesian persuasion
Webto a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver’s utility is distorted. We use this result to illustrate how mistakes in probabilistic inferences may impact optimal persuasion and … WebBayesian persuasion was first introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow [23] as the problem faced by an informed sender trying to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver …
Bayesian persuasion
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WebJul 28, 2024 · One strand of the Bayesian persuasion literature studies models where the distribution of the state is endogenous: after observing the information structure chosen by the sender, the agent can take an action affecting the distribution of the state. WebThe resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them ...
WebJun 11, 2024 · A Bayesian persuasion mechanism (hereafter, a mechanism) includes three players: the sender, the agent, and the receiver. The sender and the agent are strategic Bayesian players with preferences, which depend on an unknown state and the decision of a non-strategic receiver. WebBayesian Persuasion: Reduced Form Approach Juuso Toikka* Akhil Vohra† Rakesh Vohra‡ May 2024 Abstract We introduce reduced form representations of Bayesian persuasion problems where the variables are the probabilities that the receiver takes each of her actions. These are simpler objects than, say, the joint distribution over states and …
WebIn this paper we analyze a class of Bayesian persuasion problems where the state space may be large but Sender and Receiver’s preferences take a simple form: the state !is a random variable, Receiver’s optimal action (taken from a nite set) depends only on E[!], and Sender’s preferences over Receiver’s action are independent of the state. WebAug 2, 2024 · Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games. We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard Bayesian persuasion model, the sender has access to …
WebJun 11, 2024 · Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility.
WebApr 13, 2024 · The second main result characterizes how Bayesian belief-transitions can be represented as vectors in Euclidean space, equipped with geometric notions of magnitude and direction. Applications of the learning rule framework include facilitating belief elicitation from laboratory subjects. ... persuasion, discrimination, and social networks. lapsi käy monta kertaa päivässä kakallaWebBayesian Persuasion† By Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow* When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who … lapsi laskettelusukset pituusWeba form of Bayesian persuasion to study self-signaling and self-regulation. Caillaud and Tirole (2007) rely on a similar mechanism to study persuasion in group settings. Lazear … lapsi laittaa tavaroita suuhunWebWe describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend … lapsi lapsen normaali verenpaineWebAug 4, 2024 · We investigate how mistakes in probabilistic inference impact optimal persuasion. The concavification method is shown to extend naturally to a large … lapsi kävelee varpaillaanWebJun 9, 2024 · Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Decision-Making. We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings. An informed … lapsi kävelee jalkaterät sisäänpäinWebBayesian persuasion under alternative models of belief formation and processing is a matter of acute interest. The receiver’s systematic distortion of beliefs from Bayesian posteriors appears in De Clippel and Zhang (2024); correlation neglect in Levy et al. lapsi laulaa